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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 960271-CA

vs.
BRADLEY C. DAVIS and
HOLLY H. HYATT,

Priority No. 2

Defendants and Appellants,

Appellant Davis was on probation for a misdemeanor
theft in Kane County; Appellant Hyatt was not on probation, nor
had she been suspect of illegal conduct.

Because an officer, one

night, witnesses Appellant Davis run into a man at a truck stop,
who the day earlier was arrested for possession of a drug
paraphernalia, the appellant's probation officer and other agents
conducted a search of the couples1 home and vehicles.

The agents

lacked a reasonable facts to suspect that the appellants1 were
committing a public offense.

Nonetheless, the agents do find

small amounts of drugs and the appellants were subsequently
charged with possession with intent to distribute.

Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule
24 (c), the appellants hereby reply to the Appellee's new matters
set forth as follows:

POINT I.
DE NOVO REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS CANNOT SUPPORT
THE SEARCH; THE SEARCH LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION
Even though the appellee states the correct standard of
review for which this court must consider this matter.

The State

attempts to oppose this appeal by arguing that the appellants
must show and overcome a standard of abuse of discretion with
regards to the trial court's denial of their pretrial Motion to
Suppress.

The appellee is wrong, the Appellants do not have to

show that the trial exceeded its discretion, but rather this
Court reviews this matter de novo, according no deference to the
trial court.
On de novo review, the appellants rely raise one fact
for this Court consideration.

The only articulable fact that is

not irrelevant nor stale to this matter is Appellant Davis1
association with Mr. Blackburn—who was previous to this date
cited for possession of a drug paraphernalia.

However, this

Court reiterated in State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (1991), that the
mere propinquity of others is not sufficient evidence to support
a suspicion of criminal wrong doing.
In defense of this position, the Appellee argues that
there was a total of eight facts which the agents relied on
creating their supposed reasonable suspicion.

Note: The State

does not deny the fact that it was the officerfs observation at
the truck stop which initiated the search, the State's inclusion
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of the seven other facts are to attempt circumvent the "mere
propinquity" standard set by this Court.
By the numbers, the analysis of the State1s alleged
facts are as follows:
Alleged Fact No, 1
[S]ix days prior to the search, Davis had already violated
the terms of his probation by possessing drug paraphernalia,
possessing a firearm and [admitting to] using marijuana and
methamphetamine.
(R. at 822-(67)).
This may be true, if indeed the agents of Adult Probation and
Parole had felt that this circumstance gave rise to action on
their part they should have acted then.

Either a search or a

motion for a show cause hearing would have been appropriate at
that time.

The agents waived any right to act on this by

deciding not to take action.

Hence, six days later, the

information was stale and could not have been the basis for a
search some time later.

Alleged Fact No. 2
[T]he evening prior to the search, police officers [in
Washington County] arrested Milby for possessing
methamphetamine, and cited Blackburn for possessing drug
paraphernalia.
(R. at 822-(13-14, 2-23)).
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the
State proves nothing against the appellants. Moreover, the
conduct of these two are irrelevant to these proceedings.
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The

parties, Milby and Blackburn, are entitled to the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty, the disposition of those two
proceedings are unknown and irrelevant to these proceedings.

Alleged Fact No. 3
[T]he arrest triggered an investigation of Milby for
possible poaching and further drug activity.
(R. at 822-(22)).
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the
State proves nothing against Davis and Hyatt.

This investigation

is clearly irrelevant to the appellants.

Alleged Fact No. 4
Milby was a known drug user and possibly a drug dealer.
(R. at n/a).
This information is speculative at best. While it appears valid
that Milby was arrested for possession of Methamphetamine, it is
not shown that this information is generally known, and or that
the information made Milby a "known criminal".
no connection between the appellants and Milby.

Further there is
Furthermore, the

State fails to cite to the record regarding this alleged fact.

Alleged Fact No. 5
[0]nly a few hours after Milby1s arrest and in the course of
the investigation of him, a police officer saw Davis
approaching Milby1s house at 2:00 a.m.
(R. at 393).
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This information even taken in the light most favorable to the
State proves nothing against the appellants.

Alleged Fact No, 6
[A]t that time, Blackburn's truck was parked outside of
Milby's house with the engine running, and all of the lights
were on in Milby's house.
(R. at 392, 822-(23-24)).
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the
state proves nothing against the appellants.

Alleged Fact No. 7
Davis started to pull in to Milbyfs driveway, then turned
and accelerated away from the home when he saw a police
officer watching it.
(R. at 393, 822-(24)).
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the
state proves nothing against the appellants.

Alleged Fact No.8
[T]he police officer saw Davis meet Blackburn at a truck
stop a shortly [sic] after Davis had aborted his visit to
Milby!s house.
(R. at 822-(26) & 822-(38-40)).
What the police officer actually observed was that Davis went to
the truck stop and then independently of any of the above
enumerated events, Blackburn goes to the same truck stop.

Then

while at the truck stop, there is no actual contact made between
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the two men, not even a hand shake. (R. at 822 (26, 38-40)).
Under the totality of the circumstances, a review of
these facts indicates other more logical inferences of innocent
behavior.

Davis and Blackburn had planned to meet at the truck

stop for what ever reason, breakfast, coffee, conversation, etc,
(r. at 822-(39-40),) . . . Davis was on his way to the truck
stop, but detoured first to see if Blackburn had left Milby1s
residence yet.

When Davis drove by and saw Blackburn's truck

warming up, he decided to move on directly to the Sunshine Truck
Stop, as Blackburn would be following shortly.

Thus, all of

these facts in this matter do not depart from Munsen, rather they
support the decision of Munsen.

The officer did not observe

anything illegal about the two individuals.

He did not see them

exchange anything, not even a hand shake. Moreover, the officer
looked into the back of Blackburn's pick up to find only clean,
white snow. (R. at 822-(39-40)).
The appelleefs version of the events that took place
that evening, sound much like paranoia.

The State would like

this court to adopt its contention that Davis "pulled away from
the house when he noticed a police officer watching him" and this
suggests that "he had a less innocent reason for his visit."
See, Br. of Appellee at 16. Why didnft Davis race home then in
fear when he saw the officer?

Why didnft Davis run to the

nearest telephone and give the alarm to Milby or Blackburn?
did Blackburn know to meet Davis at the truck stop?

How

Why didnft

Davis "abort" the meeting with Blackburn at the truck stop after
the officer approached Davis with his questions?
was overconfident or just plain innocent.
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Either Davis

The facts suggest that Davis wasn!t concerned about the
officer encounter because, evidently, Davis didn't feel any
threatened by the officer encounter implicitly because he wasn't
involved in any criminal activity.

Remember, six days prior

Davis admitted some use of drugs, and logically he should have no
longer been involved in any drug activity.
continue?

Why would he

Why wouldn't it be reasonable for officers to believe

that any suspicion wouldnft be stale now?

Furthermore, remember,

that an individual's desire to avoid a level one encounter cannot
be used against the individual to create reasonable suspicion.
Whether taken individually or collectively, there is no
indication that Davis was violating any condition of his
probation at the time of the search, November 21, 1994. There
was no reasonable suspicion that Davis was violating his
probation at the time of the search, November 21, 1994.
The State has mustered all the facts it could to
support it's position, no matter how irrational some of the facts
may be.

The State relies a lot on speculation and fill-in-the-

blanks to justify the search and defend this appeal.
Collectively these facts may have given rise of concern to a
probation officer; however, there was not sufficient articulable
facts to create a reasonable suspicion that Davis was violating
his probation or to justify the search on November 21, 1994.

POINT II.
STATE V. JOHNSON IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM STATE V. HYATT.
The State further argues that Ms. Hyatt had voluntarily
surrendered some or all of her expectation of privacy because she
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lived with Mr. Davis.

The only way this search and the fruits

thereof could be used against Ms. Hyatt is if she had a lessened
expectation of privacy.

This is because there certainly were not

sufficient facts to form a basis for "probable cause" to get a
search warrant issued.

The case cited by the State (State v.

Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1073-74) for which they hold that the level
of expectation of privacy of the co-tenant is diminished is
distinguishable.

In Johnson, it was the person on probation that

attempted to use the expectation of privacy of a co-tenant to
expand his constitutional protections.

In this case, Ms. Hyatt

asserts this protection on her own behalf.

There has been no

challenge to Ms. Hyattfs standing to challenge the search.

In

Johnson, the mother lacked standing to challenge the search,
this is clearly not the case in this matter.

POINT III.
THE SOLE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPERTY WAS STOLEN DOES NOT
RELIEVE THE STATE OF THE BURDEN TO PROVE DAVIS KNEW
THE ITEMS TO BE STOLEN.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-501, states:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Id.

In this case, the State argues that the jury could only

conclude that the property was stolen.

This of course is an

assumption that there were no other reasonable alternatives as to
the disposition of the property.

The requirement placed upon the

State was to show that the property was received by an individual
knowing that it had been stolen.
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While the State argues that after hearing the testimony
of the witnesses the jury had no alternative to conclude that the
property was stolen, it was also very evident that there was a
substantial period between the time when the property was
supposedly stolen and the time the property was recovered from
Mr. Davis. (R. at 740-44, 721-30).

There was no evidence

connecting Mr. Davis with the property as to his knowledge that
the property was stolen.

As a matter of fact it was left to the

jury to conclude that the property was stolen.

All of this

testimony did no go one bit to establish the knowledge of the
appellant.

Thus, the State failed to prove a critical element of

this charge.

POINT IV.
DEFENSE COUNSEL TIMELY OBJECTED TESTIMONY.
At the time of trial, counsel for the appellants
objected to allowing the testimony of both Danny Balduck and
Blake Bentley.

Although the first objection was not on the

record because the court used the mute button on the bench to
mute the argument. (R. at 677)

It is not the belief of the

appellants or defense counsel that this was done for any improper
purpose but rather as a matter of practice by the court.

Even

though, this first objection was referred to by Mr. Burns, when
he attempted to justify the use of the witnesses by arguing "It's
also relevant to show lack of mistake, identity, modus operandi -." (R. at 702-3, 738-39).

The objection was raised and re-

addressed discussing the two individuals testimony.

The judge

allowed the testimony on those grounds and chose to disregard
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defense counsel's objections.

Regarding the testimony of both

witnesses, defense counsel argued its prejudicial effect
regarding the Utah Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b).

The

testimony provided did not conform with 404(b). (R. at 677-708).
The appellants are not raising this argument for the
first time on appeal, but it was addressed at the time these
witnesses were offered by the State on the morning of the second
day of trial.

These two witnesses were not even disclosed or

identified to defense counsel until just prior to the time of
trial.
The explanation of what took place at the time of trial
and in the newspaper as contained at page 18-20 of Appellants'
brief is to further explain both the intent of the prosecutor,
what he felt he accomplished (the newspaper article).

Clearly

what he told the judge in response to defense counsel's
objections to these witnesses and what the impact was on the jury
were entirely different.

With this in mind, the validity of the

jury's decision is substantially doubted.

The Court shouldn't

find any confidence the jury's verdict based upon the statements
of the judge and prosecutor at the time of trial.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellants request this
Honorable Court to find no merit in the Brief of Appellee.

The

probation officers lacked reasonable suspicion to search Mr.
Davis and they had no right to search Ms. Hyatt.

Out of the

eight facts that the State relies on to support reasonable
suspicion, only one is not irrelevant or stale; that is the visit
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with Mr. Blackburn at the truck stop. However, perceivably other
innocent activity are certainly presumed and would have been more
logically drawn therefrom than which was drawn by these officers.
The propinquity of others who are, have, or may be involved in
criminal activity reasonable is insufficient to support
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of a probationer.
Secondly, the prosecution failed to prove that Mr.
Davis was in possession of stolen goods knowing them to be
stolen.
Therefore, this Honorable Court should vacate the
orders reversing the convictions entered against the appellants.
Moreover, the appellants should be awarded reasonable attorney
fees and costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

16th

day of

November, 1997.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this

16th

day of November, 1997, I served a copy of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS upon the counsel for the Appellee in this
matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
Thomas B. Brunker
Office of the Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Dated this 16th day of November, 1997.
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ADDENDA

Utah Rules of Evidence 403
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b)

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

